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Effectuation, Not Being Pragmatic or Process Theorizing, Remains Ineffectual: Responding to
the Commentaries
Richard J. Arend, University of Missouri–Kansas City
Hessamoddin Sarooghi, University of Missouri–Kansas City
Andrew C. Burkemper, Coker College
We appreciate the opportunity to respond to the provocative Dialogue pieces of Read,
Sarasvathy, Dew, and Wiltbank (2016; henceforth, “RSDW”); Reuber, Fischer, and Coviello
(2016; henceforth, “RFC”); Gupta, Chiles, and McMullen (2016; henceforth, “GCM”); and
Garud and Gehman (2016; henceforth, “GG”), each of which makes several claims in defense of
effectuation, as well as describes several ways forward in entrepreneurship- and process-related
theorizing. We respond in a manner consistent with the traditional perspective in management
theorizing that “good theory is practical” (Lewin, 1945), where “theory is theory” (Simon, 1967;
Van de Ven, 1989) based on our discipline’s collective commitment to knowledge production
(Suddaby, 2014). In fact, we respond in the tradition of scientific theory—its building, its
critique, and its defense. Leveraging the logic behind that tradition, we thus refute every point
contained in RSDW’s, RFC’s, GCM’s, and GG’s commentaries and attempt to build on what is
common to all theory while celebrating what is valuable in the diversity of theorizing (i.e., in the
ways we produce theory).
The 3E framework applies to all proposed theories that claim to be scientific, including those
based in pragmatism and those based on a process. The evaluation of effectuation in Arend,
Sarooghi, and Burkemper (2015, henceforth, “ASB”) is fair, objective, scientific, and
comprehensive; most definitely considers the practical implications, human actions, and dynamic
system states of its targets; and accommodates the features of process research. None of the four
Dialogue commentaries on ASB offers any actual evidence otherwise but, instead, relies on false
implications. We respond to each commentary, separately and in relevant groupings, below.
In response to the points made by RSDW, we reply as follows: The six assumptions in ASB
emerge from RSDW’s papers (often quoted in ASB), not from the 3E framework, and, thus,
simply remain true.1 The ASB description of effectuation, including its logic, assumptions, paths,
and states, all emerge from RSDW’s papers and are accurately construed; for example,
contingencies do affect the process, and are not depicted as paths. The effectuation research
reviewed in ASB is fair, accurate, complete, standard (e.g., in the tradition of Short, Ketchen,
Shook, & Ireland, 2010, and others), and covers as wide a spectrum as the standard and explicit
1

We note several inconsistencies with RSDW’s counterpoints— for example, Sarasvathy (2001) refuted her own
Proposition 1 and supported ASB’s assumption #6 in her Propositions 2 and 3, explicitly linking effectuation with
success, and we further note that it was expert—read successful—entrepreneurs who were supposed to be the basis
for effectuation theory. Also, note that not only does that approach appear to sample on the dependent variable, but it
also appears to lead to the same false optimism described in Hirschman’s (1967) “Benevolent Hiding Hand.” ASB’s
assumption #1 is not about a priori personality traits; rather, it concerns the abilities that RSDW state their
entrepreneurs possessed, although such abilities appear only ex post (which poses another problem for effectuation
theory, but not for the 3E framework).
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constraint imposed allowed (i.e., based on the Financial Times forty-five listed journal articles).
We believe if a proposed theory is to be established, it needs to appear in the top-tier outlets,
which effectuation has yet to do in any significant manner.2 The five major directions ASB
prescribe for improving effectuation are new, based on prioritization emerging from ASB’s
critique, and surprisingly appear to be repeated by RSDW in their own directions. Overall, the
logical conclusion is that effectuation remains ineffectual (proof: we assert the 3E framework
applies to all proposed scientific theory, and if effectuation is one, then it has been critiqued
correctly as ineffectual; alternative proof: if RSDW believe the ASB depiction of effectuation is
correctly evaluated as ineffectual, and if ASB’s depiction is correct as we assert, then
effectuation is again a “scarecrow”).
In response to the points made by RFC, we reply as follows: The reality that “theories
evolve” (Reuber et al., 2016: 1) is in no way inconsistent with the necessity to evaluate them at
regular intervals. ASB very much considers productive paths not yet taken in effectuation in the
five grounded directions provided. And ASB very much recognizes effectuation as evolving
(e.g., in footnotes 1 and 8). RFC’s proposed alternative criterion focusing on whether constructs
have “stabilized” (i.e., are consistently defined, clear in scope, with clearly depicted
relationships) is explicitly addressed in ASB’s 3E framework (see E2). The 3E framework is a
robust theory-assessment tool with criteria that are agnostic about whether a theory is true (which
is a major concern of pragmatism), making RFC’s implication unfounded (and, in fact, ASB
refers to “practical” issues more than to “truth” issues). We point to RFC’s own statement about
effectuation theory presenting no evidence of its impact on entrepreneurial practice as itself proof
that effectuation is not a pragmatic theory (because such a focus on practical impact would be the
primary concern). Thus, we believe that the common defense of each of the first two Dialogue
pieces that effectuation is a different type of theory—a “pragmatic” one—and, as such, is not
open to a critique from the 3E framework holds no intellectual weight based on any premises
provided.
Boats with holes sink at high tide
Three scientific approaches to defend a proposed theory exist. Defense One: prove that
alternative theory-assessment criteria apply and are met. This defense consists of providing the
“correct” criteria (and proving why those apply rather than the proposed criteria), and then
proving the proposed theory meets them. Defense Two: accept that the given assessment criteria
do apply and prove these are actually met. This defense consists of proving that the original
criteria are met with alternative evidence, and then explaining why there is a difference in
2

Regarding ASB’s Table 2 and 2b, these are available upon request from the authors, as mentioned and described in
footnotes 8 and 9 of ASB, and were reviewed by this journal prior to being edited out for space considerations. They
depict a true, objective, and standard measure of the impact of effectuation on academia, with “the impact on top-tier
journals” being a well-established measure in the literature. The tables contain not twenty-six but twenty-nine
works. Further, we question why RSDW only use “wider” literature sources, like Google Scholar, when it suits their
purposes (e.g., they ignored the 70001 hits on “sweat equity” when they implied that this is a “black box” while
detailing their seventh direction). Finally, we question why RSDW wish to mislabel us, or the 3E framework, under
“positivism” when alternatives, like critical realism, clearly apply (Adler, Forbes, & Willmott, 2007).
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evidence regarding whether the criteria are met. Defense Three: prove that the proposed theory
was inaccurately depicted and that an accurate depiction meets the given criteria. This defense
consists of explaining what the correct depiction of the theory is and proving it meets all of the
criteria, and then explaining how the discrepancy of depiction could have arisen. The first two
Dialogue commentaries appear to pick pieces of these defense approaches without ever
completing any one of them; as such, they leave the impression that effectuation-as-a-theory is
ultimately indefensible.
Further, RSDW’s and RFC’s suggested directions lack any foundation and any basis for
prioritization, because they provide no logic identifying weaknesses in effectuation. (ASB’s
directions are solidly grounded in the weaknesses arising from its critique of effectuation).
RSDW’s list of seven areas arise out of the subjective interpretation of their own work and a
questionable wider literature review, and so lacks any objective, scientific, or practical logic.
RFC’s bases for their directions also raise questions. The authors assert that a better way to “take
stock” (Reuber et al., 2016: 538) of effectuation would involve ”recognizing its dynamic
nature” (Reuber et al., 2016: 536) by focusing on assessing whether constructs are stable. It
appears the assertion is groundless. First, the evaluation of an evolving entity at any point in time
does not conflict with the fair assessment of its use at that point in time, nor does it conflict with
its evolution (in fact, it helps). Second, there is nothing about the 3E framework that assumes
that the target of critical analysis cannot, or should not, evolve. ASB evaluates a proposed theory
at a point in time, being used by real people in that form then, from which justified directions for
evolution can then be logically argued. Third, taking stock of effectuation after twelve years of
evolution allows significant settling of its characteristics. Fourth, ASB does recognize explicitly
that effectuation continues to evolve.
Further, RFC assert that directions involving “habit”—as an important part of what pragmatism
is—are well-founded. That assertion also appears baseless. First, the pragmatist philosophy
remains underdefined in RFC, and Gross (2009) actually focuses on “problem solving” as his
version of that very splintered philosophy. Second, the more accurate quote from Gross (2009:
366) states that responsive action rather than pragmatism itself involves habit, and that even that
claim may be controversial. Third, effectuation appears to already consider habits in its
descriptions of decision-making “logics” (e.g., in the affordable loss approach). Fourth, habit
appears well-studied outside effectuation, as constructs like heuristics, routines, and operating
capabilities. Fifth, the direction of studying transitions between habit and creativity appears wellstudied already in the form of ambidexterity and similar concepts involving reflective learning.
The eye sees not itself but by pragmatism
Pragmatism is invoked in RSDW’s and RFC’s commentaries as some sort of defense, and that is
unfortunate. It is unfortunate because (1) such a defense is inconsistent with the apparent
management theorizing tradition focused on the one explanation-centered standard on which we
build knowledge, and (2) pragmatism is both under-defined and apparently misunderstood in
their commentaries. Pragmatism is a somewhat vague philosophy of science that is like a cloud
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from which RSDW and RFC each chose a particular speck of dust; for example, over a century
ago, it had already splintered into thirteen forms, most of which were defined by their notions of
the nature of truth (Lovejoy, 1908). As such, it seems RSDW and RFC share a misunderstanding
of pragmatism as being not about truth and truth finding, when, in fact, it is (e.g., there is a
pragmatic theory of truth, and pragmatist social science seeks truthful knowledge about how
things work in social life [Watson, 2011]).
Besides that basic misunderstanding, RSDW and RFC also share a misperception that
effectuation is a pragmatic theory; it is not. The literature reveals no support for such a
categorization; instead, it refutes the idea that effectuation is a true pragmatic theory. For
example, Watson (2013: 25) notes that while effectuation acknowledges pragmatism as one part
of its intellectual lineage, effectuation diverges from pragmatism in important ways; for example,
pragmatic nonlinear patterns are expected to apply to managers as much as to entrepreneurs in
the latter, but not in the former. Steyaert (2007: 465) notes that effectuation (1) is only partly
grounded in pragmatist philosophy and (2) has not made a practical impact after twelve years
(supporting RFC’s similar contention), which is an outcome that is inconsistent with that
philosophy. Finally, RSDW and RFC both summarize their versions of pragmatism in a few
words, but Papini notes that “whoever should define pragmatism in a few words would be doing
the most anti-pragmatic thing imaginable” (2005: 122).
Ambition should be made of sterner stuff
Given the unusual challenge of having to react to a table of points (see RSDW’s piece), we
employ a suitably unusual response here. We ask the reader to consider effectuation not as a
theory but, rather, as a collection of marketing choices that includes its construction as an
umbrella of previously established concepts, its misrepresentation of what it contrasts with, and
its “form” as the kind of message that people want to hear. Doing so provides a basis for the
rejection of all three parts of RSDW’s table.
We reject the first part of their table for two reasons. First, it misrepresents the widely accepted
critique that effectuation has not acknowledged or built on previous work, and it fails to show
specifically how effectuation has added original value. Second, it shows effectuation as selfservingly linked to known ideas (e.g., experimentation, risk sharing, making do, adaptability,
action orientation, loss aversion, and so on), without explaining why connecting to them matters.
Simply pointing out that effectuation is related to these ideas amounts to a tautology where
effectuation is related because it is defined by the ideas of others (e.g., even the Uppsala model
mentioned in RSDW was an entrepreneurial decision making under uncertainty approach—an
approach similar in function to effectuation—that predated effectuation by some twenty years).
We reject the second part of their table for two reasons. First, claiming some level of empirical
support is also tautologous because such support of its component parts, which have been well
established in prior work (e.g., on experimentation), is expected. Second, the works cited do not
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provide significant support for effectuation as a unique theory.3 Nearly all of the empirical
studies consider effectuation as a logic, a venture creation mode, a construct, or an approach;
none consider it as a theoretical system. Consequently, most of the empirical findings are based
on comparisons of effectuation with other modes of action, especially what has been defined as
“causation.” There is only one study in the table that qualitatively supports the superiority of
effectuation over causation (Kalinic, Sarasvathy, & Forza, 2014). In the other studies effectuation
is analyzed descriptively, with its effectiveness compared to other approaches in a contextual or
stage-dependent manner. Also note that we discovered a further flaw of effectuation in the
process (and it is a logical flaw)—that is, “expertise” is hypothesized to reduce the uncertainty
faced by the entrepreneur, yet such reduced uncertainty would lower the need to apply
effectuation as the very process that expert entrepreneurs are supposed to use more but who
should then use less!
The marketing choice by effectuation scholars that provides both empirical support and
educational attraction centers on contrasting effectuation with an approach described as some
“thing” labeled causation. For example, the firm inflexibility characterized in the measurement
of causation has aided the empirical support for effectuation being favored in surveys by socalled expert, pivoting entrepreneurs. However, it is worthwhile to note that causation is a rather
poor and overly simplistic caricature of microeconomics, whether considered as positivist or not.
For example, consider that even the “heart” of effectuation (as RSDW describe it)—defined by
the often delusional belief that the entrepreneur can actively change his or her world and future
—is actually very well understood in the real economic positivist tradition (e.g., in Schumpeter’s
[1934] creative destruction, in Kirzner’s [1985] focus on the available means described by
Penrose [1959], and in Shackle’s [1955] action taking under uncertainty).
Finally, we also reject the third part of their table for two reasons. First, it misrepresents ASB’s
critique that effectuation does not establish practitioner value and, instead, presents data about
pedagogical adoption and website and press popularity. It is easy to explain the draw of
effectuation’s empowering message for the public—a message that anyone can be a successful
entrepreneur if he or she just follows a simple process. However, numbers of books, courses,
instructors, and Internet eyeballs do not actually constitute evidence of practitioner value.
Second, there is little evidence to date that all of the effectuation-based education has actually
made a positive impact, either in an absolute sense or in a relative sense, as compared to the
impact of alternative, noneffectual entrepreneurship education approaches.
We would be remiss if we did not comment on a few additional choices made by RSDW to defend effectuation, as appear in the RSDW piece. For example, in comparing ASB’s Figure 1 to
Sarasvathy’s textbook Figure 12.2 (Sarasvathy, 2008: 274), the ASB figure covers all but one of
the “boxes” from the original logic (n.b. we do not explicitly cover the social welfare box) and
adds only the factors (e.g., a feedback loop) that were implicit in that logic; the assumptions
asserted in ASB about effectuation are valid (e.g., regarding #2, nonpredictive control is part of
3 A table

analyzing the extra empirical works is available upon request from the authors.
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effectuation’s definition as not needing to predict a controllable future); and ASB’s directions
cover all of RSDW’s directions (e.g., RSDW’s direction 4 is covered in ASB’s directions 2 and 5
on goal setting and cooperative abilities). Thus, RSDW’s choice to allege “misconstrual” (Read
et al., 2016: 528) as a defense and to ignore their own quotes and overlapping ideas all appear to
be off message.
Pragmatic directions for the collaborators
Further directions for effectuation’s evolution, based on our critique of RSDW’s and RFC’s
commentaries, acknowledge the tradition in management for the need to have a reverence for
science and its method if one wishes to contribute to theory. Direction One: choose one standard
defense logic (of the three outlined above) and follow through on it completely. Direction Two:
focus on unifying the explanation-centric approach to theory that has been traditional in
management, rather than splintering it, but if the latter is chosen, be very specific and consistent
about what that splintering is (rather than what it is not) and why such an unusual choice is
valuable to the field at this point. Direction Three: be academic in spirit and practice; refrain
from stating something as “fact” without providing solid evidence (e.g., that effectuation is a
pragmatic theory), refrain from sticking the proposed theory’s name on something and
coronating it a “thing” (e.g., there is no such thing as an “effectual spirit,” and we believe that
kind of branding is not science), and refrain from usurping previous ideas (e.g., ambidexterity)
by stating that they somehow model effectuation’s unproven concepts. Direction Four: rather
than incorporating goal hierarchy, connect effectuation to an established process (like the
garbage-can model); for example, for the idea that solutions and problems—or goals and means
—can connect in an individual, an experiential process is likely a better fit.
A process of elimination
We now turn to the last two Dialogue pieces, both of which leverage the idea of process theory as
a defense for effectuation. For hundreds of years there has been one core conceptualization of
theory, one that has included processes, across science—in chemistry and biology (e.g., diffusion
models)—and social science (e.g., in game-theoretic models of decision making), even
encompassing probabilistic and time-dependent relationships among observables. Apparently, to
some, that all changed with one chapter in one book, as suddenly there was a second
fundamental type of theory then called “process theory” by Mohr (1982). At the time, this
“incredible revelation” was met with a dull thud—as evidenced by the contents of four published
reviews (Hendrickson, 1983; McKiernan, 1984; Pfeffer, 1983; Robertson & Macdonald, 1984),
all of which seemed to find that the poorly referenced, underargued assertion of the existence of
a second type of theory was a somewhat desperate attempt to find some “stability of results
across research studies” (Pfeffer, 1983: 324), and that Mohr nevertheless believed in a core
concept that all theory “should be able to provide stable, consistent prediction of
behavior” (Hendrickson, 1983: 706). As such, we question the reverence of Mohr’s process
theory by GCM and GG (along with the unwarranted attacks on variants like the so-called
synthetic theorizing of Baron, Eisenhardt, and others). We question why scholars who worry
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about the promotion of one type of theorizing at the expense of others are happy to do just that
themselves.
We agree with the constructive and inclusive approach of Langley (1999: 691) and others who
draw on Weick (1979) and acknowledge that there exists one definition of theory, where theory is
supposed to be “accurate, parsimonious, general and useful” (i.e., addressing E2 and E3 in the 3E
framework), with multiple strategies to get to it, including process research, and that theory
building involves data-driven generalization (E1, E2, and E3), theory-driven hypothesis testing
(E3), and inspiration (E1 and E2). In other words, we see the explicit agreement from top
scholars in process research that the assessment criteria in the 3E framework do apply. How
could they not? Does process research–based theory not build on valid observation (E1)? Does it
not explain phenomena drawing on units (e.g., events), laws (e.g., probabilistic relationships),
boundaries, states (e.g., times when measurements and interventions can occur), assumptions,
and logic (E2)? Does it not seek to establish its value in generalization and in increasing the
understanding of phenomena for its stakeholders (E3)? If it doesn’t, how exactly is what some
call process theory a form of science?
Categorical delusions of grandeur
First, neither GCM nor GG prove that effectuation fits their definition of a process theory. For
example, effectuation does not meet the requirement for time ordering to be critical (Van de Ven
& Engleman, 2004) or the requirement for a listing of ingredients and a recipe that tells how Y
occurs whenever X does (Mohr, 1982). In fact, Moroz and Hindle even note that Sarasvathy’s
hedging places the “roots of effectual logic within an equilibrium-based perspective” (2012:
804).4
Second, neither GCM nor GG prove the existence of a set of papers describing a process that
occurs on some separate ontological and epistemological plane, as effectuation’s set of papers
fails to do as well. In fact, McMullen (the M in GCM) and Dimov’s (2013) Figure 1 depicts how
the same “observation space” (read the same idea of reality and knowledge) can be divided into
both variance- and process-based research.
Third, the “rich” depictions of process research (in contrast to the alleged stark ones of variance
research) as somehow a superior form of capturing a phenomenon, and thus generating better
understanding, are suspect. The reality is that all research papers are subject to the same pagelength restrictions; that while qualitative data may paint wonderful pictures, quantitative data
4

There are several instances in the work of effectuation scholars that clearly demonstrate a variance-based logic.
First, the causation-effectuation dichotomy is written in variance-based terms as the comparative propositions of
Sarasvathy (2001). Second, Read, Dew, Sarasvathy, Song, and Wiltbank’s (2009) meta-analysis of effectuation and
venture performance is based on the premise that there is an inherent variation in the extent to which firms or
entrepreneurs follow an effectual logic. Third, Sarasvathy, Kumar, York, and Bhagavatula (2014) acknowledge that
empirical measures of effectuation are necessary, citing Chandler, DeTienne, McKelvie, and Mumford’s (2011)
developed measure of effectuation. Finally, RDSW’s table of effectuation research contains many studies that have
followed variance-based logic.
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also provide deep insights; and that all research, both empirical and theoretical, involves
simplifying reality in order to focus on important factors (e.g., events and variables) and relationships (e.g., whether linear or nonlinear, sufficient or necessary). No one type of research (e.g.,
variance or process) dominates all others for the examination of phenomena; complementarity is
desired—for example, “answers to process research questions tend to be meaningless to their
users without an answer to their corresponding variance theory questions” (Van de Ven &
Engleman, 2004: 355).
Label it false
Many of the arguments in GCM and GG are rooted in mislabeling; we address and correct
several of those issues here. First, a “system state,” even a stable one, can be an “event” or any
other theoretical or real (naturally or artificially delineated) intermission where field
measurements can be taken or managerial interventions can be done. There is absolutely no
requirement for a strict equilibrium (i.e., where no change occurs). As such, any argument that
the 3E framework does not accommodate processes, based on mentioning the term state, is
meritless.
Second, we do admit to describing what effectuation is supposed to model as “a process”; that
does not, however, imply that we consider effectuation to be a process theory.
Third, labeling the language in ASB as pro-positivist and normal science, and the 3E framework
as variance based or strictly positivist, is simply wrong. We were inclusive, appealing not only to
those writing standard theoretical papers who use propositions (Delbridge & Fiss, 2013) but also
to others not doing so by drawing on process scholars like Pentland (1999), and by referring to
process ninety-four times (which, according to GCM, implies that it plays “a highly influential
role” [2016: 541] in the 3E framework), in order to argue for a shared core of “what theory is”
across approaches.
Fourth, equating theorizing with theory is misleading; we agree that there are many ways to
theorize (i.e., what one does to produce a theory; Swedberg, 2012), but that in no way implies
that there are many types of theory (in fact, Swedberg’s phases and rules are consistent with the
3E framework). An appeal by GG to DiMaggio’s (1995) “theory types” does not help either,
since the definition of “narrative theory” involves empirical testing and scope condition
delineation—assessment criteria straight out of the 3E framework.
Fifth, the idea that “performativity” is another theory-on-another-plane is also misleading. Bohr
himself notes that traditional measures can be used to study the phenomena defined as such (see
Barad, 2003: 814), making the 3E framework applicable (and, in fact, Van de Ven and Poole
[2005] rightly point out the ironies of the performative approach in that words do reify these
processes ex post and so a representational evaluation can be done).
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Sixth, performative utterances (e.g., I name this ship “Poseidon”) are abstractions (Austin, 1962:
146) and can certainly be evaluated in terms of being right or wrong, especially ex post (Austin,
1962: 145), as could any “theory” describing action.
Seventh, the 3E framework does not screen out observations of any type; it is a theoryassessment framework open to all valid observations (in E1).
Eighth, the inference that the 3E framework negatively affects work on “grand challenges” is
wrong. We are very much interested in addressing such wicked problems in reality, with or
without formal academic theorizing (as social entrepreneurs have done for decades), and see no
reason why the 3E framework cannot help guide formal theory building relevant to these
phenomena. Just because GG label such challenges performative, where the focus is on action,
does not mean any one approach has a claim; all science, certainly all applied science, is about
the intention to intervene in the world, and that certainly fits well with the engineering-friendly
3E framework.
Directions to improve the 3E framework
It is valuable to consider how to leverage the 3E framework further. (We were disappointed that
the Dialogue authors did not offer specific suggestions for improving the framework.) One
further refinement that could be made is to add the evaluation of any proposed theory on its
“internal coherence” among the framework criteria. For example, Burrell and Morgan (1979)
spoke to a need for fit among the assumptions over ontology, epistemology, methodology, and
“human nature” in a theory’s approach. One further way to leverage the 3E framework would be
to vary its depth of application depending on whether the proposed theory is only “partial”’ or
“mid-range,” versus fully formed.
An effective way forward
We wish to build on the sentiments of Delbridge and Fiss to find “a willingness to engage
constructively across a range of approaches to theorizing, rather than a defensive
positioning” (2013: 330). We find it disappointing that the defenses in the four Dialogue
commentaries to a fair and explicit critique of one proposed theory have been based on divisive
arguments that propose that no core of “what theory is” exists (and upon which an assessment
framework can be built). The authors assert that the targeted proposed theory is somehow
impervious to criticism because it is alleged to be a new type “X” of reality/knowledge/
phenomenon (e.g., pragmatic or process based), yet not so new as to lose the benefits of the label
“theory.” All that without evidence that the proposed theory fits the specifics of X, if there was
any consensus on what X was to begin with. All without providing a set of alternative criteria
that needs to have zero overlap with the offered framework (and proving that the proposed theory
meets all such alternative criteria). And all apparently violating a consensus on “what theory is”
that has existed for hundreds of years across diverse fields of research, including those that study
X-type phenomena (e.g., pragmatic and process-based phenomena).
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We want to engage constructively, and our intention in providing the 3E framework was to do
just that. We based the framework on how top management scholars have used the term theory,
focusing on the papers that describe how to build better theory, as well as those centered on how
to assess it. We certainly did not offer the framework to be exclusionary. We value diversity in
theorizing. But, much like how “intellectual property” is defined, we also respect that only
specific “things” can be theory—those contributions centered on novelty, usefulness, and nonobviousness (where usefulness stems from coherence as a description and explanation of
experienced phenomena; Gioia & Pitre, 1990). The 3E framework is offered as one step toward a
brighter future for social science theorizing, a future that is seen by standing on the shoulders of
the giants on whose work this framework draws. It is a future where the research spanning the
relevant ranges of ontology, epistemology, method, and assumption can be complementary
within a “mosaic of understanding” of the many dimensions of any given phenomenon, and
where such a range of understanding can then be accessed, in a customized way, to apply in a
specific use (e.g., by a manager, policy maker, and so on).
We also want to engage constructively with newer fields like entrepreneurship. One way to do
that is to provide a general and flexible theory-building framework to help move such fields
forward toward differentiation and away from sim- ply being the application phenomena (or
dumping grounds) of the haphazardly applied theories of related disciplines. Another way to do
that is to provide an objective and fair way to assess proposed theories and partial theories in a
growing field; as a result, the scholars (and journal referees) in that field should be able to more
efficiently identify better proposals, as well as identify where current proposals leave gaps to be
filled by the next wave of work. We believe that the 3E framework provides those ways.
In closing, we thank RSDW, RFC, GCM, GG, and AMR for allowing us the opportunity to
engage in a vigorous dialogue that will hopefully aid in building better theory, especially better
entrepreneurship theory, in the future.
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